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Abstract: The international system of nation-states is evolving into
something more complex and indeterminate. One important development has been the creation of regional communities. If these are
to thrive in their own distinctive way, national governments, including
the United States, will need to support creative policies that harmonize
interests, not only within such communities but also among them.
Policy planners, therefore, must think globally and act regionally.

N

ot so long ago, “international relations” meant “inter-state
relations.” Issues of war and peace belonged exclusively to
the governments of states. They ruled the world. This was
commonly called “the Westphalian system,” after the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia, which dictated the principle of independent national sovereignty and laid the geopolitical foundation for the next several centuries.
It replaced a more decentralized system that was much like the
system now emerging in this age of transition. The Westphalian system
has given way to one in which the dominance of nation-states is challenged by global and regional entities, as well as subnational ones.1
National governments no longer have a monopoly over the use of force
on a large scale and, hence, over decisions concerning war or peace.
Their power is seeping away.
Fragmentation, or disintegration, appears to be the inevitable “other
side of the coin” from the integration inherent in the process of globalization. The reasons for this are not altogether clear. Perhaps the
disintegration has occurred because power has been reallocated within
the international system. Perhaps global institutions seem too remote.
Certainly, the export of jobs and competition with workers in distant
countries breed reactions leading to barriers between nations.
Probably a mix of all these factors has contributed to this reaction,
and we might reasonably invoke the philosophy of Hegel to suggest that
a new system of governance will be a synthesis of globalization and
localization. In any case, arguably, all of the conflict and turmoil that has
affected the Euro-Atlantic region since the end of the Cold War, perhaps
even the end of the Cold War itself, has resulted from the ambitions of
actors operating below the level of states. Ethnic cleansing, the rise of
political Islam, the dissolution of multinational states, over-reaching by
financial organizations—all these are evidences of fragmentation. The
correlation with the successes of globalization during this same period
is too strong to ignore.
National governments are fighting to retain their authority but it
appears to be a losing battle. The technologies and tools they deploy
to preserve their share of power also undermine it, as individuals and
networks have become empowered by information technology. Barriers
1      Rodrigo Tavares, “Foreign Policy Goes Local,” Foreign Affairs, October 9, 2013.
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to trade only serve to weaken that power further. The process of creating new forms of governance continues unabated, but in a more or less
haphazard fashion.
This development does not mean that nation-states are going away
or that their powers are permanently lost. In fact, one of the striking
things about the history of nation-states is not merely how enduring they
have been, but also how successful most have been in adapting to new
geopolitical and economic conditions.

A European Example

The archetype of cooperation is still the “European project,” despite
its many internal tensions. In Europe, a true security community has
been constructed, where its members never entertain the thought of
war among themselves. But even in Europe, nation-states survive and
in a few cases appear to thrive. The half-century of European integration has served them well. To use the language of one of contemporary
Europe’s best known historians, the late Alan Milward, supranationalism has served to rescue the nation-state.2 This verdict is not universally
held but nation-states do coexist with other structures designed both to
limit and to extend their power.
Nation-states today matter more for what they do than what they
represent. We need to focus less on whether or not they may cease to
represent large communities and more on how they behave toward one
another, and toward their own citizens.
So long as nation-states exist, so will nationalism. The transition of
a system based on one form of national behavior into another is bound
to generate conflict, particularly of the old-fashioned nationalist variety.
How best can national governments mitigate it? For Americans in particular, the rule of law, backed by global institutions like the United
Nations, was the stock answer.
For many nations, it still is the correct answer. And yet global
institutions have had limited success in dealing with regional conflicts.
For those conflicts, which are the main threats to global peace today,
a region-based approach is essential. Indeed, regionalism has emerged
as the preferred way in which the middle powers of the world have
elected to pool their sovereignty. This approach sustains the viability of
the nation-state and reduces the appeal of nationalism. It grants those
activities with the most disruptive potential, like economic competition,
a stake in a positive process of change.
Cooperation at the global level remains difficult to achieve. Many
believe that this transition has gone into reverse. The Wikileaks and
National Security Agency revelations suggest that national governments
are busy retaking control of the global environment with the tools previously used to diffuse power away from them. There are rumblings
throughout the world of a new round of protectionism, trade barriers
and the like. The Economist recently proclaimed the emergence of a “gated
globalization.”3
2     Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge,1992).
3      Greg Ip, “The Gated Globe,” The Economist, October 12, 2013.
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Technology is continuing to change our world, particularly the relationship between government and its people. Private organizations are
the main generators of this change, not governments, and governments
are dependent on them, just as monarchs were dependent on the grand
seigneurs in pre-Westphalian times.
Surprisingly, the emerging order begins to resemble the tiered
system of medieval Europe, with an overarching layer of global institutions exercising some normative influences and a number of local power
centers, including nation-states, highly dependent on their ability to
mobilize private, very powerful economic organizations. It is a structure
in which loyalties easily become divided and diffused.
The most effective structural change that could be injected by
nation-states into the new forms of governance would be a renewed
emphasis on regionalism. Europe may not be the model that nations
elsewhere will want to follow, but other, simpler, models already have
emerged—North America, Southeast Asia, and perhaps Africa and
Latin America, among them. Policies that encourage the further evolution of these models would be on the right side of history.
Good governance will demand that regional communities not act
as blocs, shutting out one another’s members or allowing others to fall
through the cracks. Regional communities will only work over the long
term if they consistently promote both intra- and inter-regional cohesion. Their paths to regionalism must be their own, but for outsiders it
means placing an explicitly higher priority on regional policies—and
regional sensibilities—over clearly global ones.

US Influence and Regional Affairs

American interests and policies loom large in every regional setting.
This is true closest to home. It is seldom mentioned how potentially
powerful North America has become. In an article that appeared in The
Wall Street Journal last summer, former Secretary of State George Shultz
remarked on the integration of the economies of the United States,
Canada, and Mexico:
The three countries constitute around one-fourth of global GDP, and they
have become each other’s largest trading partners. A 2010 NBER study
shows that 24.7% of imports from Canada were U.S. value-added, and
39.8% of U.S. imports from Mexico were U.S. value-added. (By contrast, the
U.S. value-added in imports from China was only 4.2%.). This phenomenon
of tight integration of trade stands apart from other major trading blocks
including the European Union or East Asian economies.4

A cohesive North America thus can exert a strong influence on
global trade and the strengthening of liberal institutions. “North
America, with the U.S. in the lead, is the world’s center of creativity and
innovation,” Shultz continues, “Any measure will do: new companies
formed, Nobel Prizes received, R&D spending, attractiveness to high
talent from anywhere, patents issued, and numbers of great universities.”5
This all may result someday in the beacon of a world’s most successful
regional community, where armed frontiers are transformed into pros4      George P. Shultz, “The North American Global Powerhouse,” The Wall Street Journal, July
11, 2013.
5      Ibid.
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perous borderlands, and where economic power and political influence
go hand in hand.
This moment is still a long way off. But contrast it to where North
America was just a couple of decades ago before the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A logic of regional peace has appeared
in other regions meanwhile. Whether by design or by default, diplomacy,
specifically American diplomacy, has begun to resemble the kind of cautious, step-by-step path of constructing better neighborhoods without
the obvious need for bigger fences. Some developments elsewhere
include:
•• The Middle East. The Obama administration reportedly is trying to be
less hamstrung in the unending struggles there but it is unlikely to
succeed, if only because it already is engaged in reinvigorating talks
between the Israelis and the Palestinians; has worked with Russia to
find a way to contain and eventually to reverse the course of the Syrian
civil war; and has been blamed—rightly or wrongly—for exacerbating recent turmoil in Egypt and elsewhere in the region.6 Meanwhile
it has forged ahead in helping to reverse the threat posed by Iran’s
nuclear ambitions by exploring ways to reassure both Iran and its
neighbors that a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race is neither desirable
nor inevitable.
•• Central and South Asia. The administration has sought to reestablish
a more normal relationship with Pakistan as North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) troops withdraw from Afghanistan, although
this is proving very difficult.7 Economic ties between India and
Pakistan, which the United States supports, are the best hope for
ending the risk of war between these two key nations. Regional
cooperation that includes Afghanistan may also become a possibility,
particularly now that Afghanistan’s northern neighbors, the former
Soviet republics of Central Asia, are desperate for investment and
access to markets following the removal of NATO largesse from their
backyard.
•• East Asia. The administration has worked with China to stop the
cycle of crises coming from North Korea and is seeking multilateral
solutions to territorial disputes nearby. A regional organization for
security and cooperation in Northeast Asia may become part of a
political settlement there.
•• The World Trade Organization. As the WTO is stymied in further trade
liberalization, the administration has launched the two largest trade
negotiations since the collapse of the Doha Round: a transpacific and
a transatlantic free trade area. Some have called this a new backdoor
method to global trade, but it promises to be much more than that if
negotiations, admittedly very difficult, someday succeed.8
Most of these policies are in harmony with the systemic transition
underway which is dispersing power to global, regional, and local groups,
6     Edmund Sanders, “Anti-Americanism Flares in Egypt as Protests Rage Over Morsi's Ouster,”
Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2013.
7     Shuja Nawaz, “A New Honeymoon for the United States and Pakistan?” New Atlanticist,
November 1, 2013.
8     Ana Palacio, “The Regional Route to Global Free Trade,” Project Syndicate, August 1, 2013.
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and empowering them with access to information that was never shared
with them in the past.
But what this diplomacy also shows is that preventing conflict is
more the task of regional interaction rather than of globalization per
se. It has taken too long for it to sink in that while globalization by
definition has spread around the world, it affects different places very
differently and, in some, strengthens rather than diminishes the draw
of nationalism. For the United States, still the world’s most powerful
nation-state, this reality calls out for recognition and action.

The Continuities of Policy

In the spring of 2000, we wrote an article called “Back to Basics: US
Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade,” in which we sought to define US
strategic interests, beginning with the proposition that the nation’s main
foreign policy goals were the success of globalization and of democracy,
but that its means for achieving these goals were unfocused.9 We spoke
of methods for managing regional interests as an important way to bring
better focus to them.
US policy still is unfocused. President Obama has not embedded his
regional initiatives in an explicit long-term strategy that is in tune with
historical change. Currently, they are seen simply as a set of disjointed
actions that respond haphazardly to local problems, offering headlines
for “trend lines,” as President Clinton liked to say.
Obama’s response lacks any connective tissue and so it looks pretty
meager, especially in regional forums. The president has attended few
European Union summits and has never gone to an African Union
summit. The only region where some sort of long-term strategy can be
discerned in the administration’s rhetoric is in the repositioning to Asia,
but this has mainly been part of an ill-disguised effort to balance China’s
rise, rather than the recognition of the benefits that concerts of nations
can bring to a world in transition.
Aside from embedding US regional diplomacy in a unified coherent
strategy for peace, a better approach calls for finding and exploiting
near-term regional opportunities. In the two trade negotiations, for
example, large global powers like the United States may need to adjust
more than they otherwise would to the necessities of smaller, regional
states with incomparably more at stake. Or, in the Middle East and
Northeast Asia, it could involve devising a common security language
and a code of regional conduct while encouraging people in these places
to apply them to their own affairs as they see fit, especially as the US
military presence around the world continues to ebb.
This approach would fit well an old American diplomatic tradition but one that has gone relatively unrecognized. The genius of the
Marshall Plan, for example, was not so much its generosity toward starving Europeans in 1947 or its self-interest in building prosperous new
markets for American goods and investment. It was both these things.
But most of all, it was a grand political gesture which said to Europeans,
if you agree to work together from now on, we are prepared to help you,
9      James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, “Back to Basics: US Foreign Policy for the Coming
Decade,” Parameters 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 51-56.
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but we shall not dictate the precise terms of your cooperation beyond
insisting that you do, somehow, cooperate in our mutual benefit.
Cooperate is in fact what the Western Europeans subsequently did.
They took some advice from the Marshall Planners but not all of it. They
pursued their own path toward a regional community, through many fits
and starts and reversals, on their own terms but also in consultation and
collaboration (and occasional contestation) with outside backers, namely
the United States. Regional autonomy is not the same thing as autarky,
just as regionalism, internationalism, and globalism need not necessarily
be mutually exclusive orientations or recipes for economic and political
change.
Proposals to replicate the Marshall Plan model elsewhere have long
been abundant; however, few have emphasized its basic principle of
regional self-help. This principle has the potential to construct more
peaceful and prosperous neighborhoods; however, its main effect is
representational: that is, to show that even long-established rivals sitting
side by side can transform their enmities into patterns of cooperation
whose value is much greater than the sum of their parts. This realization
need not mean sacrificing every national source of power and influence
in the process, but does require a demonstrable sharing of power among
nations and regions.
The process has no hidden hand or honest broker, however much
the United States has cast itself in that role in the past. It takes continuous and difficult negotiation, and, most of all, public understanding and
support.
Obama’s first major achievement has been to convince a good
number of his fellow Americans that the United States is a part of the
world and has an obligation to listen more often. His next achievement,
if the various negotiations succeed, would be to help set in motion
workable processes of regional peace so that the United States itself can
be at peace and prosper, both at home and abroad. It would mark an
important step forward in the remaking of a weary superpower into a
credible great power.
Power itself has changed. So have the means for wielding it. Today
we repeat this almost as a mantra. But the changes have been more
gradual and cumulative than most analysts suggest. They do not necessarily represent a clear-cut shift on the commanding heights, or as
others would have it, a new permutation of the balance of power among
merchants, soldiers, and sages. Something different appears to be taking
place. The currency of power has shifted, namely in the ways in which
nations collaborate or compete with neighboring nations, and groups
within these nations, to maximize their advantages vis-à-vis more
distant neighbors.
The major challenge facing our leaders is to fashion a stable but
liberal system for accommodating the many interests and passions of
this new era while using the leverage they still have, which is considerable. It would be easy to give in to the lowest common denominator and
just muddle through. In that direction lays chaos.
Of course, global institutions are essential in terms of pointing the
way to a universal system of norms and obligations to support peace
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with justice. But for the rest of this century, an active regional diplomacy,
not disengagement, will be the best way to manage the fundamental
transformation in the global system now underway.
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